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I. Introduction: Protectionism as an Icon of Trade Politics

A paroxysm of the United States’ protectionist drive has recently shocked the
world. To protect domestic steel industries from foreign competition, the Bush
administration launched the so-called “Steel Initiative,” 1 soon after it took office in
2001.2 Under the initiative, the federal government could impose additional tariffs on
foreign steels in the name of safeguard measures.3 The federal government also protected
the interests of agricultural industries in farm states such as Texas and Mississippi4 by
introducing the “Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002” or “Farm Bill” in
which the Congress committed lavish farm subsidies of up to 180 billion dollars for several
years.5 Even President Bush himself described this bill as “generous.”6 The United States’
farm support in 2004, hovering around forty-six billion dollars, marked an increase of
eighteen per cent, which is the largest among the world’s rich countries.7 Not surprisingly,
national politics, particularly as evinced by the 2000 and 2004 elections and heated
“swing state” battles,8 lay behind this surge of protectionist campaigns.

1

The White House, Statement by the President Regarding a Multilateral Initiative on Steel (Press
Release, Jun. 5, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010605-4.html (last
visited on May 14, 2003) [hereinafter White House Press Release].
2
See Daniel T. Griswold, A Wall of Steel, available at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/articles/dg-7-801.html (last visited on Aug. 10, 2005).
3
White House Press Release, supra note _.
4
The White House, President Signs Farm Bill (Press Release, May 13, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020513-2.html (last visited on May 14, 2003)
[hereinafter Farm Bill].
5
See Houses Pass $180 B Farm Bill, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 2, 2002.
6
Farm Bill, supra note _.
7
Raphael Minder et al., OECD Study Shows Scant Reduction in Subsidies to Farmers over Past 10
Years, FIN. TIMES, Jun. 22, 2005, at 1.
8
See Virginia Postrel, Why Bush Stiffed Enron, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002, at A18.
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Protectionist trade politics has become even more tenacious and atmospheric than
ever before. This spring, the U.S. Secretary of Energy suggested lifting tariffs on ethanol to
meet rising domestic demand for this alternative energy source. Because the U.S.
government commits billions of dollars in subsidies to producers of domestic corn-based
ethanol, importing cheaper Brazilian sugar-based ethanol by lifting a fifty-four-cent-agallon tariff on foreign ethanol sounds compelling. Yet, this proposal infuriated politicians
whose constituencies produce domestic ethanol, including Senator Charles Grassley from
Iowa, who lambasted the proposal as a “kick in the teeth for rural America.”9 The
formidable corn lobby from the Farm Belt eventually torpedoed this proposal in the
House.10

Understandably but unjustifiably, the upcoming November mid-term election this
year has provided protectionism with fresh momentum, though protectionist issues are
often cloaked as security concerns or other popular nationalistic themes. For example, the
Congress has recently aborted Dubai Port World’s takeover of a U.S. port and bashed
China over its record-high bilateral trade deficit with the U.S.11 Many politicians
seemingly assume that the U.S. commitment to open trade will militate against national
security,12 despite the high risk of this position being abused as pretexts for sheer

9

See Alan Beattie, Brake on Biofuels as Obstacles Clog the Road, FIN. TIMES, May 9, 2006, at 6.
End Ethanol Subsidies Now, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2006; Corn Laws of the 21st Century, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 2006.
11
See Doha in the Doldrums, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 06, 2006, at 12.
12
See The Rising Tide of U.S. Protectionism, Fin. Times, Mar. 13, 2006, at 12.
10
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protectionism.13 In a similar vein, Bill Thomas, Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, admitted that protectionism against the backdrop of a nationalistic stance
(“preserving our way of life”) has become a trendy campaign theme.14

Perhaps protectionism is inevitable in a representative democracy.15 “All politics is
local,”16 and every industry has its First Amendment right to lobby and petition to
preserve its special interest. Protectionism may be the price we pay for democracy.
Nevertheless, the current wave of protectionism in the United States is troubling in its
frequency and scale. It certainly looms larger than seasonal election year politics.17 The
U.S. protectionist politics has also complicated the current Doha round negotiations
under the World Trade Organization (WTO)18 because the Unites States refused to
substantially reduce trade-distorting farm subsidies.19 Yet, protectionism is only likely to
deepen as the U.S. economy adjusts itself to a new economic environment which imposes

13

Gray G. Yerkey, U.S. Trade Official Cites ‘Worrisome’ Trend Toward Protectionism Tied to Security
Fears, 23 INT’L TRADE REP., Mar. 30, 2006, at 506.
14
Id.
15
Public choice theorists proffer a gloomy conclusion that politics in the machine of democracy
tends to eventuate protectionism on account of rent-seeking behaviors of interest groups (domestic
producers). CHARLES K. ROWLEY ET AL., TRADE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (1995).
16
See generally Tip O'Neill, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL, AND OTHER RULES OF THE GAME (1994).
17
In this context, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has officially warned that the U.S. should curb
protectionism. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Review Urges U.S. to Head Off Protectionism; China Criticizes Port
Reaction, 23 Int’l Trade Rep. Mar. 23, 2006, at 437; Doug Cameron & Frances Williams, WTO Calls on
U.S. to Resist Protectionism, Mar. 23, 2006.
18
Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], LEGAL INSTRUMENTS–RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 6, 6-18; 33 I.L.M. 1140, 1144-1153
(1994).
19
Doha Round Suspended Indefinitely After G-6 Talks Collapse, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS
DIGEST - Vol. 10, Number 27, 26 July 2006. Some politicians, in particular from the farm states, even float
the idea of extending, not modifying, the internationally contentious Farm Bill. About That Free Trade, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2006.
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more severe global competition than ever before. Today, politicians regularly face the
temptation to respond to economic woes with protectionism.20

Against this backdrop, this article problematizes protectionism, which is iconic of
trade politics, and suggests certain legal means to discipline it. This article argues that law
should no longer be subordinated to the politics of capture but instead offer a prescription
to trade politics so as to fulfill such constitutional goals as economic freedom and
deliberative democracy. Therefore, this article is oriented to legal regulation of trade
politics, not political regulation of trade law.

In an attempt to better comprehend trade politics, Part II analyzes the
phenomenon of protectionism through three lenses: government structure, context and
social psychology. It concludes that protectionism is attributable to, and also reinforced by,
the United States’ decentralized government structure, altered econo-political
circumstances, and cognitive problems in perceiving gains and pains from trade.

Part III then describes the various costs of protectionist trade politics.
Protectionism sneakily imposes a huge protectionist tax on consumers and consuming
industries for everyday items such as bras, shirts, shrimp, sugar, lumbers, and even

20

See Martin Feldstein, The Return of Saving, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 87, 92-93 (2006) (warning that a
failure of economic adjustment by both the U.S. and its trading partners in the era of a higher U.S. savings
rate will precipitate a surge of protectionism globally); Brian Reading, Woe Betides Us (and the U.S.) If
Depreciation of Dollar Fails in a World of Excess Supply, FIN. TIMES, May 31, 2006, at 10.
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candles.21 It also deviates from global trading norms, which the U.S. hypocritically
continues to preach adherence to for the rest of the world. This double standard creates
images of “American Exceptionalism”22 and undermines the effectiveness of the
multilateral trading system. For example, the recent extravagant U.S. farm subsidies made
a “mockery of the idea that the Doha round is to be a development round.”23

Confronting these ever-intensifying pathologies of protectionism borne by trade
politics, Part IV suggests certain judicial options to discipline trade politics and thus curb
the current wave of protectionism within the constitutional framework. It argues that the
Court should reinvigorate both structural and substantive due process to monitor and
check atrophying protectionist policies. Legislative process should become more
disciplined and transparent to prevent procedural abuses, like “riders.” Measures
suspected as protection should undergo strict scrutiny, and should fail absent compelling
justifications for them. Part IV also submits that certain essential global trading norms,
such as the non-discrimination principle, may be internalized by the Court under
constitutional doctrines, such as Charming Betsy. These constitutional options encompass
both a Madisonian ideal (protecting broad public interests against narrow special interests)
and a Lockeian ideal (upholding economic freedom), while they also serve the WTO’s
ideal (free trade).

21

According to one estimate, such a protection tax is equivalent to a national sales tax of 6
percent. See Consumers for World Trade, Protectionism in America: Watch Your Wallet!, available at
http://www.cwt.org/ (last visited on Jan. 20, 2006).
22
Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1483.
23
World Trade: Coming Unstuck, THE ECONOMIST, at 14, Nov. 2, 2002; The Zoellick Plan: Trading
Insults, THE ECONOMIST, at 67, Nov. 30, 2002.
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II. Understanding Protectionist Trade Politics: Structure, Context and Psychology

A. Governance Structure

1. Decentralization

Under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, foreign affairs power belongs to the
president.24 However, the president cannot claim a monopoly in foreign policy-making
since in practice the power is shared by Congress. 25 The separation of powers in the area
of foreign policy has been a puzzle to many observers. Alex de Tocqueville believed that
U.S. foreign policy lacked “patience, persistence and secrecy.”26 This observation, which is
a testimonial to the “decentralized” structure of the U.S. government, has frequently been
reiterated by subsequent scholars.27 Being one aspect of foreign policy,28 trade policy
24

U.S. CONST. art. II, §2. See also Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Exectuive
Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L. J. 231 (2001).
25
This decentralization or rigorous “separation of powers” is a common feature which is derived
from the Constitution and affects most US foreign policies. Louis Henkin observed that:
“Perhaps the ‘contraption’ was doomed to troubles from the beginning, for although the Framers
ended the chaos of diplomacy by Congress and of state adventurism, the web of authority they
created, from fear of too much government and the need for contemporary political compromise,
virtually elevated inefficiency and controversy to the plane of principle, especially in foreign
relations.”
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 28 (2d ed. 1996).
26
See notably ROBERT L. PAARLBERG, LEADERSHIP ABROAD BEGINS AT HOME: U.S. FOREIGN
ECONOMIC POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR 32 (1995) (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 243-44 (1945)).
27
Stanley Hoffman viewed the U.S. government structure as “too complex and too sprawling” to
produce coherent yet flexible foreign policies. Id., n. 2 (citing Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver’s Troubles, Or the
Setting of American Foreign Policy (1968)). Likewise, Paarlberg eloquently presented a list of seven
“enduring and distinctive” features of the U.S. political system that have undermined its external
leadership: “divided government,” “congressional power over trade,” “disunity and discontinuity in the
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exhibits the same characteristics. In other words, it may be difficult for a trade policy to
become coherent and consistent in the face of an ever-demanding Congress, which
represents variegated voices of widely-spread constituencies. Moreover, the Congress
holds the “Commerce Power,”29 which is a constitutional authority to regulate not only
federal commerce but also foreign trade. This congressional mandate in foreign trade,
together with the decentralized government structure, effectively dwarfs the president’s
power to formulate and implement trade policy in a coherent way, i.e., in a way that
represents and values benefits to the broad national economy over narrow special
interests. Thus, U.S. trade policy is vulnerable to capture and parochialism. It tends to be
adrift at the mercy of sector-specific lobbies or in the vicissitudes of local economies
whose constituencies are represented by Senators and Representatives in the House.30

Yet, another layer of decentralization within Congress further brews protectionist
trade politics. In particular, the proliferation of subcommittees in Congress, especially in
the post-Watergate era, provides fertile ground for protectionism.31 These subcommittees
function as small kingdoms, often uninfluenced by and independent of party rules.
Commanding relevant expertise and human capital in their particular jurisdictions, they

executive,” “transparency of policymaking,” “legalism in policymaking,” “federalism,” and “an insular
popular culture.” Id., at 32-53. Raymond Vernon, Debra Spar, and Glenn Tobin also regarded
decentralization as a defining attitude of the US foreign trade policy. RAYMOND VERNON ET AL., IRON
TRIANGLES AND REVOLVING DOORS: CASES IN U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING 4 (1991).
28
ANNE O. KRUEGER, AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: A TRAGEDY IN THE MAKING 2 (1995)
29
U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
30
STEPHEN D. COHEN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF US FOREIGN TRADE POLICY: ECONOMICS,
POLITICS, LAWS AND ISSUES 115 (1996).
31
Both chambers of the Congress together had more than 250 committees and subcommittees by
the Nineties. PAARLBERG, supra note _, at 23.

8

often incubate certain policies and control the agenda-setting.32 Empowered by this “gatekeeping” capacity, subcommittees facilitate the infamous processes of logrolling and porkbarrel spending.33 Consequently, members of Congress tend to divert a great deal of time
and resources to parochial matters, which are of significant concern to their own
constituencies, away from national law-making projects.34 On top of this, the U.S.
bicameral system and the existence of a conference committee to reconcile the different
versions of both chambers (“messaging between the chambers”) also tend to reinforce the
power and voices of committees since conferees are drawn mainly from committees of
pertinent jurisdictions and represent the views of those committees with stakes in the
deliberation process.35 It is not difficult to conclude that this decentralized subcommittee
system attracts targeted lobbies from special interest groups.36

Of course, Congress has “delegated” its constitutional authority on foreign trade
to the president. For example, in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 Congress
voluntarily delegated its power over trade policy to the executive after the disaster caused
by the protectionist Smoot-Hawley Tariffs Act of 1930--deepening the Great
Depression.37 Yet, as I. M. Destler aptly observed, such delegation is motivated by selfserving interests of legislators who wanted to insulate, and thus protect, themselves from

32

ROWLEY ET AL., supra note _, at 113-16.
Id., at 114.
34
For example, more than a half of staff resources for members of the Congress is channeled
toward local matters, rather than national law-making. Id.
35
Id., at 117-18.
36
Id., at 122. See also M.P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
122 (1988).
37
SHARYN O’HALLORAN, POLITICS, PROCESS, AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 71 (1994).
33
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lobbyists and local industries, rather than by a philosophical shift to liberal trade.38
Therefore, Congress still reserves its veto power in trade matters.39 The “fast track”
authority is a case in point. Under the Trade Act of 1974, the Congress conferred the
president a special authority, coined as “fast track” authority. Under this procedure,
unlike usual legislative procedures, Congress up or down vote on trade agreements that
the president has negotiated without any possibility of bottling up or adding amendments
on the floor. Yet, this special entrustment in trade policy-making came with certain
restrictions: Congress can still revoke fast track authority if Congress (certain committees
or both houses) passes a resolution disapproving the president’s authority.40 As a result,
the executive should not only report to and consult with various congressional
committees but also “enfranchise” special interests into the negotiation through
hearings.41 Also, the president should accommodate special interests in the final trade
agreement to ensure its passage even under the fast track authority.42

Although the executive often attempts to adopt and implement anti-parochial
trade policies, often through international trade agreements, those attempts have been
impeded and have even backfired due to an overzealous Congress that reclaimed its
authority on the regulation of foreign trade. For example, by the mid-Eighties Congress
had effectively undermined implementation of any U.S. trade agreement outcomes by
38

See I.M. Destler, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STRESS (1986)
O’HALLORAN, supra note _, at 7. See also COHEN ET AL., supra note _, at 117 (1996) (observing
that such delegation is limited in scope and duration); PATRICK LOW, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND U.S.
TRADE POLICY 130-32 (1993) (observing that such delegation is “with reserve” and “both incomplete and
short term”).
40
O’HALLORAN, supra note _, at 141.
41
Id., at 182.
42
Id.
39
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utilizing trade remedies.43 For example, even if foreign market access to the U.S. market
was improved through international deals, such improved access could be effectively
curtailed by domestic measures such as antidumping measures.

Nonetheless, the president does not always command a broader (national)
constituency than the Congress.44 Due to yet another aspect of the U.S. decentralized
political system, the “electoral college,” the president is often forced to exercise
protectionism in a strategic way.45 The president may increase his or her chances of
reelection by favoring certain industries whose economic interests are embedded in
certain states that are either his or her traditional political stronghold or potential
supporters such as swing states. This consideration may explain the political motivations
behind President George W. Bush’s “Steel Initiative” in 2001, which protected steel
industries many of which are located in swing states such as Ohio and Pennsylvania, and
“Farm Bill” in 2002, which protected southern farmers many of which are in President
Bush’s old political base, such as Texas.

Summing up, the underlying decentralized structure in the U.S. constitutional
setting tends to make the U.S. trade policy inductive to special interests and local control.
This unique political structure often forces U.S. trade policy to succumb to protectionism.

43

See J. Michael Finger, The Origins and Evolution of Antidumping Regulation, WORLD BANK
WORKING PAPERS (WPS 783), Oct. 1991, at 26-27.
44
ROWLEY ET AL., supra note _, at 128-29; O’HALLORAN, supra note _, at 5.
45
Id., at 129.
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2. Lobbying

In the U.S., lobbying is an important part of political life. Everyone can freely
appeal to the government and politicians to speak up for his or her own (or others’)
interest.46 The constitutional optimism on the pluralist political process is embedded in
the First Amendment47 and its jurisprudence such as the “marketplace of ideas.” In his
seminal dissenting opinion in Abrams v. U.S. (1919), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
joined by Justice Louis Brandeis, wrote that the “ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas.”48 Robert Dahl also applied this “market” analogy to the political
process by contending that political decisions are channeled by bargaining among interest
groups and lawmakers in an aggregated form.49 Some even attempt to justify a
“constitutional” right to lobby via constitutional theories or doctrines such as the right of
petition theory and the associational privacy.50

Economists have demonstrated a causal relationship between lobbying and
congressional votes. Timothy McKeown and Benjamin Fordham have concluded that
economic interests, both as contributors and constituents, shape congressional floor votes
as to trade policy.51 Critically, the cost of such lobby may not necessarily be high. In a

46

See e.g., U.S. Senate, Lobbying Forms and Electronic Filing Center, available at
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/generic/lobbying_registration.htm (last visited on Aug. 8, 2006).
47
COHEN ET AL., supra note _, at 117.
48
Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
49
Chantal Thomas, Challenges for Democracy and Trade: The Case of the United States, 41 HARV.
J.ON LEGIS. 1, 3 n. 12 (2004); ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
50
See Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right to
Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 192-93 (1993).
51
Timothy J. McKeown & Benjamin O. Fordham, Selection and Influence, Interest Groups, and
Congressional Voting on Trade Policy 28 (2000) (conference paper). Cf. Robert E. Baldwin & Christopher
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provoking study, José Anson has showed that the U.S. steel lobby has spent a relatively
small amount of money on campaign contributions for its protection in stark contrast
with conventional wisdom.52 Likewise, Robert Fischer et al. also proved that votes for
domestic steel protection could be bought cheaply in their study on the steel import quota
bill of 1999.53 This counter-intuitively high return of the steel lobby may be expounded by
its long history of lobby in the same sector as well as local politicians who are susceptible
to lobbyists’ influence.54

As a result of this lobbying culture, the U.S. has a “producer-oriented,
complainant-initiated trade policy system,”55 which relatively ignores unorganized yet
widely-diffused consumers’ interest as well as the larger impact of domestic protection on
the U.S. economy in general. As Anne Krueger aptly observed, “[I]f citizens could easily
identify and directly vote on the magnitudes of gains and losses from protection,” the
current U.S. trade policies would be shifted.56 She concluded that “American trade policy
has become increasingly schizophrenic as fear of competition and pressures from special

Magee, Is Trade Policy for Sale?: Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills, 105 PUBLIC CHOICE 79 (2000)
(showing that campaign contributions influenced congressional votes on trade bills such as NAFTA and
UR bills).
52
José Anson, Steel Trade Policy Lobbying at U.S. Congress: How Much Does Money Matter? (2003),
available at http://www.hec.unil.ch/janson/steeldoc.pdf, at 12-13 (last visited on Aug. 12, 2005).
53
Robert C. Fisher et al., Steeling House Votes at Low Prices for the Steel Import Quota Bill of 1999,
DUKE ECON. WORKING PAPER #02-24 (2002), at 19, available at
http://www.econ.duke.edu/Papers/Abstracts02/abstract.02.24.html (last visited on Aug. 12, 2005).
54
See e.g., U.S. Rep. Phil English, Steel Caucus, Others Lobby Administration Lobby for Maximum
Help for Steel Industry, available at http://www.house.gov/english/press2002/bush201022202.html (last visited
on Aug. 12, 2005). See also Steel’s Tariff Addiction, WALL ST. J, Aug.20, 2002.
55
C. FRED BERGSTEN & MARCUS NOLAND, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?: UNITED STATES –
JAPAN ECONOMIC CONFLICT 191 (1993).
56
KRUEGER, supra note _, at 3.
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interests influence a variety of sectoral policies even as we continue to assert our support
for an open multilateral system.”57

Legalization of trade politic is an indispensable component in establishing the
lobbying culture. Most U.S. trade statutes are designed for private industries to petition
their own grievances to the government for any remedial measures. This structure is
compatible with the American culture and values embodied in the First Amendment and
the model of accountable, and thus democratic, government. In a sense, every industry
which is allegedly harmed by unfair foreign trade practices acts like its own “private
USTR.” Private industries in competition with foreign rivals control a unilateral
enforcement mechanism by initiating such a process and also by providing the
government with crucial information necessary for its investigation.58 This privatization of
trade remedies under various statutes testifies to the “American obsession with regulation
through formalized rules.”59

A litigious culture together with a vast army of lawyers in the U.S. (more than
700,000 as of the early Nineties) also tends to encourage special interests and their

57

Id., at 6.
David Palmeter, Commentary, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY
AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 160 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) [hereinafter
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM];See also Jay L. Eizenstat, The Impact of the World Trade Organization on
Unilateral United States Trade Sanctions Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: A Case Study of the
Japanese Auto Dispute and the Fuji-Kodak Dispute, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 137, 154 (1997); JOHN H.
JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 70 (1990).
59
J. Michael Finger, The Meaning of “Unfair” in United States Import Policy, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 35, 41 (1992). See also DESTLER, supra note _, at (documenting how changes in some details of the
U.S. trade remedy law (antidumping statute), such as stricter deadlines and jurisdictional shift, caused a
“flood” of petitions from domestic producers who could potentially benefit from those petitions).
58
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lobbyists to file lawsuits as a vehicle for their cases to be heard.60 Nearly three-quarters of
all Washington lobbyists are reportedly involved in such litigation.61 While such extensive
litigation may contribute to democratic virtues by ensuring public participation in the
trade policy-making process, it may also block the formation of such trade policy that
speak to the broader public interests.62

In summation, one might reasonably speculate that the ethos of “freedom” or
“right” to stage and vindicate individual or sectoral interests, whose root may be found in
the First Amendment, allows well-organized local industries to prevail over a rather
vaguely-defined general interest of state or national economy. Certainly, Congress has
been an effective conduit for such special interests.63 And, most importantly, the cost of
lobbying is not high.

B. The Context Transformed

1. The Diminishing Giant Syndrome

While the celebrated and glorified fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the
Cold War brought the U.S. a satisfying sentiment of triumph, this new international
landscape also contributed to protectionist U.S. trade policies. In a uni-polar world, or
60
61

(1994).

62
63

PAARLBERG, supra note _, at 45.
KAREN O’CONNOR & LARRY J. SABATO, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: ROOTS AND REFORM 551
PAARLBERG, supra note _, at 45.
See The Lobbyist Empowerment Act, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2006.
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Pax Americana, where the “Evil Empire” no longer exists, the U.S. feels less obliged to
exercise its hitherto leadership for a free world and focuses much more on its narrow
interests. Trade is no longer an issue of foreign policy, but of domestic policy subject to
enormous pressures from interest groups.64 Notably, a renowned economist Jagdish
Bhagwati dubbed this post-hegemonic phenomenon as the “Diminishing Giant
Syndrome.”65

During the Cold War, the U.S. could frame its national interest into a global,
more precisely Western, interest. Senator Russell Long (D-LA), Chairman of the Finance
Committee from 1965 to 1981, is said to have often criticized the State Department for
sacrificing U.S. industrial interests to diplomatic considerations.66 Yet, in a post-Cold War
era the U.S. has found fewer incentives to maintain such a long-term goal in foreign
affairs. Likewise, the U.S. has also lost its tolerance for international organizations and has
become more allergic to “international federalism.”67 This weakened leadership and
reduced commitment to multilateralism have provided a fertile ground for nurturing
unilateral trade justice in the name of “fair trade.”68 Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Senator
Long's successor as Chairman of the Finance Committee, which drafted the Omnibus
64

See Vinod K. Aggarwal, The Political Economy of Service Sector Negotiations in the Uruguay Round,
16 THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFF. 35, 37 (1992) (viewing that “hegemonic decline” provide
domestic political actors with “greater opportunities to press their cause and potentially disrupt
international negotiations”).
65
Jagdish Bhagwati & Douglas A. Irwin, The Return of the Reciprocitarians: US Trade Policy Today,
10 WORLD ECON. 109, 109 (1987).
66
Paula Stern, Reaping the Wind and Sowing the Whirlwind: Section 301 as a Metaphor for
Congressional Assertiveness in U.S. Trade Policy, 12. 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (1990).
67
John O. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of
International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903, 903-04 (1996).
68
THOMAS O. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN THE U.S.
TRADE POLICY 4 (1994).
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Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 Act, once stated that “[T]here was a time when
we were so dominant from an economic, political and military standpoint that we could
afford to [concede those trade] points for some foreign policy objective of the moment.
That day has passed.69

In summation, in the Cold War era, the U.S. acted as a hegemon by “[trading]
short-term concessions for possible long-run gains.”70 This is not the case any more. In the
post-hegemonic era, U.S trade policy seems vulnerable to protectionist politics without
strong foreign policy considerations.

2. Bad Economy

Recently, the widening U.S. trade deficit has alarmed both the public and the
government and sparked a call for the rethinking of U.S. trade policy.71 Yet, it is one of
the basics of national accounting that the trade deficit is a different name for the fiscal
deficit. A nation’s net imports, imports minus exports, mirror its net investment,
investment minus saving.72 Therefore, nations should tighten its fiscal budget to narrow
the trade deficit. However, it is doubtful, at least in the near future, whether the U.S.
69
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government will be able to tighten its fiscal belt with the recent sizable tax cut and everincreasing spending in the area of national security and defense, not to mention to
increasing costs due to an ageing population.73 This unpleasant economic atmosphere is
yet another fertile ground for protectionism and hostile reactions to foreign trade
practices. Political pressures from domestic industries and labor unions become more
intense as U.S. economic woes worsen. It often appears much easier for politicians to find
fault with foreigners, their products and particular aspects of their production process,
rather than admitting problems of U.S. domestic policies and attempting to fix them,
especially when the federal budget is not adequate to cushion the impact of international
trade via the social safety nets. 74

In the late Eighties and early Nineties, when the U.S. suffered the same economic
trouble, i.e., the Twin Deficit, the U.S. flexed its muscle and wielded its heavy weapon of
unilateral trade policies such as Super 301 against those trading partners that held big
trade surpluses vis-à-vis the U.S., such as Japan, Korea, and India. Under the threat of
such trade sanction, numerous protectionist pacts such as Voluntary Export Restraints
(VERs) were signed outside the legal realm of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).75 The notorious “Japan-bashing” was also salient on Capitol Hill.76 In a
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historical déjà vu, “China-bashing” has recently gathered steam in Congress. The U.S.’
mounting bilateral trade deficit with China has recently stimulated protectionist
sentiments among politicians.77 Along the same lines, the U.S. government has recently
pressured China to restrict its clothing and textiles exports to the U.S.78 China responded
to this pressure by taxing their own exports, which seems to be inconsistent with the
WTO rules.79 Yet, apparently unsatisfied with such export taxes, the U.S. government,
despite the Chinese protest, has also pushed forward the idea of safeguard measures
against Chinese textiles exports under a side deal, which China had to tolerate to become
a WTO Member.80 Furthermore, in a move reminiscent of the Plaza Agreement in the
Eighties, the U.S. government has demanded China to float its currency, renminbi, in
hopes of improving the U.S. trade balance vis-à-vis China, which seems to be a futile
policy according to experts.81

In summation, U.S. protectionist politics become intense in times of economic
downturns, which tend to make the protectionist cycle coincide with the economic cycle.

C. Social Psychology
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1. Asymmetrical Perception of Gains and Pains of Trade

Benefits of trade, such as the increase of consumers’ welfare and general growth
effect, tend to materialize in the long-term. Those gains are also thinly-spread to many
unidentified people who fail to appreciate them and take them for granted. However, the
pains of trade, such as dislocation and adjustment, transpire quickly and become
concentrated on particular groups of people, such as particular industries losing
competitiveness and their workers, who are thus well-organized. Therefore, there exists
an asymmetry in people’s perception of benefits and costs of trade liberalization.82 This
cognitive factor tends to reinforce a protectionist proclivity in trade politics because it is
usually those well-organized interest groups that regularly patronize and thus capture
politicians. It is difficult to build a free trade coalition comprised of consumers or the
general public because, although benefiting from trade liberalization, they lack sufficient
incentives to organize and lobby for free trade.

This cognitive asymmetry is further buttressed by the public choice theory.
According to the theory, most voters tend to become ignorant of any particular trade
policy because their interests are not affected directly and promptly on an individual
basis.83 They lack incentives to study and inspect the benefits and costs of trade policies.
Therefore, while these voters constitute the “malleable” median-voters and thus are
critical in passing certain legislative acts, they are easily taken advantage of by well-
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organized interest groups.84 Similarly, these neutral, median voters tend to show a “status
quo bias” by being risk averse to any social disruption, such as dislocation, which may
result from the elimination of trade protection.85 Therefore, the general population is
inclined to support, or at least acquiesce to, pre-existing protectionist policies, rather than
bear the feared negative consequences, such as social disturbance, of free trade policies.

2. The Fear Factor

As discussed above, perceptions or images of the effects of trade policies are
created, imprinted and stored through a mechanism of human psychology that is prone to
errors and irrationality. The graphic nature of local protests and violence waged against
free trade creates fear in the minds of observers as to the consequences of foreign
competition. This phenomenon of “social cascades”86 may leave very little room on
people’s cognitive radar for accepting the amorphous benefits of free trade, thereby
disenabling them to evaluate free trade in an unbiased way. Therefore, while people may
understand a general rationale of free trade in their mind, they are disinclined to accept
some of its consequences in their heart.87

The nature of the news media is likely to reinforce the fear factor in the general
population’s evaluation of the consequences of free trade. News agencies tend to amplify
84
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the fear since their coverage mostly prioritizes rather flamboyant scenes, such as mass
demonstrations and violence, which enjoy certain “news value.” News agencies seldom air
how free trade benefits the general public and the national economy as a whole, which
may risk boring their audiences.

Yet, the problem is that the fear factor bestows on the vested interests good
opportunities for controlling and even manipulating public images on free trade. A
coalition of interest groups and politicians defend and advocate their protectionist
positions by waging negative social marketing. They sensitize and often exaggerate
negative side effects and other collateral damage from trade liberalization. For example, in
the 1980’s certain U.S. industries such as steel and automobiles, which were losing
competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign countries, campaigned for protection as they took
advantage of the fear of “deindustrialization” which conjured up “images of Americans
reduced to flipping hamburgers at McDonald’s” while those foreigners took over the main
U.S. industries.88 Often, this fear-mongering is wedded to the catchphrases of national
interests or patriotism. Domestic industries often attempt to justify protectionist measures
by claiming that buying American serves the national interests of the U.S. and thus is
patriotic.89

88

Jagdish Bhagwati, Overview, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note _, at 10.
Todd E. Pettys , Our Anticompetitive Patriotism, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1353, 1411-12 (2006)
(quoting Thorstein Veblen who viewed that an “us-versus-them patriotism” are often introduced by those
who are to gain from “such restraint of international trade as would not be tolerated within the national
domain”).
89

22

In sum, special interests tend to mobilize necessary political capital for
protectionist measures by means of a psychological warfare which takes advantage of
people’s fear of negative consequences of trade liberalization. This fear-mongering
eventually rationalizes old and new protectionist policies.

III. Revealing Pathologies of Protectionist Politics: A Dual Crisis

A. Domestic Crisis: Constitutional Failure

Protectionism leads eventually to “constitutional failure”90 in that it goes against
the foundations of the U.S. Constitution. It undermines the integrity of a federal
marketplace by proliferating the rent-seeking behavior of special interests. (Madisonian
failure) Protectionism also restricts trade, and thus competition, as domestic prices fail to
fall due to such trade restrictions. Trade restriction can be translated into a deprivation of
economic freedom reserved to market participants because it disables those market
participants from engaging in certain economic transactions with foreign economic
players that would guarantee greater efficiency and larger economic welfare than closed,
domestic transactions. (Lockeian failure)
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First, protectionism may be translated into a Madisonian failure in that national
economic welfare is hijacked by a handful of domestic industries, which might be depicted
as economic “factions.” 91 Trade protection, such as tariffs and quotas, is a form of
“protection tax” which the public unsuspectingly pays in feeding those special interests.
American consumers pay such protectionist tax equivalent to 17.2% when purchasing
clothes due to trade barriers, 13.4% for leather luggage and 7.3% for footwear.92 All in all,
American consumers pay an extra 6-7% on protection taxes on average for imported
staple goods.93 Protectionism also sacrifices jobs of the many to protect those of the few.
For example, to save one job in the U.S. shrimp production sector, twenty other jobs in
shrimp-consuming industries such as processing and distribution are sacrificed.94 Likewise,
each steel job saved by U.S. antidumping tariffs cost three jobs in steel-consuming
industries.95

Protectionism also entails antitrust behaviors of those rent seekers (special
interests). For example, antidumping remedies tend to “cartelize” domestic markets
because such measures restrict foreign producers’ market entries and effectively fix prices
by disallowing prices to fall. More often than not, the mere threat of antidumping
91
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petitions by domestic producers invokes cooperative behavior (collusion) from a foreign
producer since responding to the petitions are themselves enormous burdens to foreign
producers regardless of the final results of the antidumping investigation.96

Second, protectionism deprives citizens of the economic freedom to consume and
of the rights to property. Protectionism, as a form of government interference with the
free market principle, cannot but undermine economic players’ rights to trade and
consume by forcing them to engage in such transactions as are distorted by protectionist
measures. Thus, protectionism might violate rights to property in a Lockeian sense since
those unwanted economic choices due to protection usually lead to increased economic
costs incurred by importers and consumers.97 For example, American consumers could
have paid far less for their automobiles and built their property (wealth), but for steel
tariffs that were imposed to protect the moribund U.S. steel industry. The overall value of
each American’s property was forced to decrease on account of additional economic costs
(tariffs) whose sole purpose was to protect special interests.

In sum, protectionist politics runs contrary to the founding principles of the U.S.
in that it tends to undermine peoples’ economic freedom and sacrifice economic welfare
of the many for the few.
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B. International Crisis: American Exceptionalism

Protectionist politics not only serves parochial interests at the expense of broader
public interests but also blatantly disrespects the opinions of mankind in that it goes
against the letter and the spirit of global trading norms. As an economic superpower, the
U.S. is expected to lead other trading nations in pursuing free trade policy. Yet, while the
U.S. has vigorously used the global trading system to deter its trading partners from
adopting protectionist policies, it has not hesitated to support its own industries when
they are in trouble.98 This double standard, which is an icon of “American
Exceptionalism,”99 incurs various costs to the U.S.

Foreign reactions to American Exceptionalism vary. Very often, a targeted
country eventually falls to continuous U.S. pressure and signs an agreement acquiescing
to the demands of the U.S. Sometimes, these agreements result in an involuntary form of
collusion in the global dimension because they tend to reduce the supply of certain
products against free market mechanism, as seen in the VERs.100 Trading partners also
replicate the U.S. protectionism for a strategic reason. The recent proliferation of
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antidumping remedies, especially among developing countries, is attributable largely to
their defensive behaviors against the U.S. active use of this type of protectionism.101

Nonetheless, exceptionalism always carries serious costs. It incurs a certain
“reputation cost” since these policies appear illegitimate to the eyes of foreign trading
partners.102 The result may be a loss of “soft power,” namely the ability to set the agenda
and lead others to follow it.103 Yet more grave cost may come from the risks of retaliation
and subsequent trade war.104 Recently, ever-growing transatlantic trade tension as well as
the rise of China’s economic influence tends to make such risks more likely. It should be
noted that any trade war may actually result in a collapse of the entire multilateral trading
system and devastate economies of individual trading nations, including the U.S. As
Professor Harold Koh warned, U.S. exceptionalism, if left unchecked, will eventually
weaken the legitimacy and efficacy of global trading rules preventing the U.S. from relying
on those rules when it needs them the most to pursue its own national interests.105

IV. Judicial Regulation of Protectionist Politics: A New Constitutional Dynamics
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A. A Case for a Judicial Approach

As discussed above, a confluence of varying factors, such as the unique
government structure of the U.S., changed circumstances and social psychology, is
attributable to the recent rise of protectionism in the U.S. Although such trade politics
may be explicable, it is not justifiable, its grave costs, not only to the U.S. but also to the
rest of the world, warrant appropriate disciplines on the U.S. via apolitical, i.e., legal,
means. Yet, such legalization should not be left exclusively to the Congress, which is
subject to capture. A number of trade statutes are in fact the outcome of legalization of
trade politics through logrolling and pork-barreling.106 Under these circumstances,
legalization tends to exacerbate protectionist politics, rather than discipline it.

Therefore, another government branch, i.e., the Judiciary, should intervene under
the constitutional principle of checks and balances. The court may review, from a due
process perspective, the constitutionality of those trade statutes which lack an adequate
level of deliberation as a result of protectionist trade politics. It also can require
lawmakers to demonstrate a compelling reason to protect special interests at the expense
of the larger public interest. The court can even internalize free trade norms under the
WTO, such as non-discrimination, by invoking related constitutional principles such as
Equal Protection and Charming Betsy. In sum, a constitutional, not simply legal, approach is
in order to discipline protectionist trade politics.
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B. Reinvigorating the Due Process

The Judiciary may broaden the road to deliberation and thus contribute to more
adequate representation of non-protectionist voices from the public.107 Professors Daniel
Farber and Philip Frickey have located this opportunity in the court’s more “aggressive
overseeing” of the legislative process to check the power of special interests.108 The court
may mandate legislative deliberation by cautiously establishing the “prima facie
unconstitutionality” of certain suspect groups of legislation that can be cleared only by
demonstrating the existence of such deliberation.109 Moreover, at a more technical level
the court may focus on the “procedural regularity” that the Congress itself established.110
Farber and Frickey noted that according to the wisdom of public choice theorists, such
strict compliance with procedural disciplines deters strategic behaviors by special interest
groups.111

By requiring this legislative deliberation, the court can effectively check certain
abusive legislative behavior in the Congress, such as the “rider” or the “earmark.” A rider
means a certain provision sneakily attached (“earmarked”112) to an unrelated statute
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because such provision cannot survive the congressional debate or vote on its own
merits.113 The rider tends to “force passage”114 by simply riding on an important piece of
legislation, such as an appropriation (spending) bill. Because the Congress must adopt the
bill only as a whole, the rider tends to guarantee its passage regardless of its merits.
Therefore, some powerful politicians often introduce blatantly protectionist riders which
cater only to particular constituencies.

Using the rider, Congress, which was captured by southern catfish farmers, passed
a notorious statute prohibiting Vietnamese catfish farmers from marketing their products
as “catfish” in the U.S. without any scientific grounds.115 Attached to an agricultural
appropriation bill, this protectionist piece of legislation was passed “without debate and a
vote.”116 It was also through a rider that another notorious protectionist statute, the Byrd
Amendment,117 was passed without any debate as it was attached to a 2001 spending bill.
From 2001 to 2004, USD 1 billion collected as antidumping duties were distributed to
U.S. domestic producers who filed antidumping complaints against foreign rivals.118
Surprisingly, two-thirds of such a large amount of money went to only three industries:
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steel, candles, and ball bearings.119 In 2005, the Senate Agriculture Committee voted to
extend agricultural subsidies expiring in the 2007 Farm Bill until 2011 by sneakily
inserting these subsidies in a budget bill, rather than debating it as part of the Farm Bill.120

Requiring a legislative deliberation, such as adequate debates or a vote, can
effectively check the abusive practice of riders by disclosing their protectionist nature in
the public sphere.

In addition to this procedural, structural aspect of due process, the court should
also bring into play “substantive” aspects of due process in tackling captured trade politics.
The “substantive due process” under the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendment subjects
the government to strict scrutiny when it undermines, via its regulation or legislation,
“fundamental” values of individuals, such as life, liberty, and property.121 For the purpose
of this paper, one might construe the liberty as connoting “economic freedom” by which
each and every economic player can freely compete in the market without undue
government interferences. As discussed above, protectionism tends to violate economic
liberty (or rights to property) of economic players, such as importers and consumers, by
depriving them of economic opportunities of choosing foreign goods over like domestic
products which have become more costly than the former due to protection.122
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Admittedly, this proposition might be viewed as a departure from the current U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence in that the titular “substantive economic due process” clause
once symbolized by Lochner came to its demise a long time ago. In the pre-depression era,
the Lochner court notoriously struck down a New York statute limiting bakers’ working
hours as a violation of economic liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.123 Yet, as
Justice Holmes lambasted with a metaphor of Social Darwinism in his dissent,124 Lochner
was severely criticized as a blind pursuit of laissez-faire economic theory at the expense of
legitimate social regulation, such as protection of the economically powerless.125 Lochner
was eventually overruled by Parrish in which the Supreme Court upheld a state minimum
wage law.126

Crucially, however, the end of the Lochner era should not be automatically
translated into undue justification of protectionist government measures. While the
Court should not employ the substantive due process doctrine to hinder the government
from pursuing “legitimate,” i.e., non-protectionist, policy objectives, as the Lochner court
did in 1905, at the same time it should not endorse protectionism via weak judicial review
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in the mechanical compliance with post-Lochner rationality test.127 The government
should be required to demonstrate that its measure is truly necessary to achieve the
putative regulatory goals under strict scrutiny, instead of being immunized from any
meaningful judicial investigation.128

In fact, a careful reading of Parish corroborates this position. The Parrish court
emphasized an “additional and compelling consideration” which should be devoted to
address the exploitation of workers in the depression era.129 The court took a “judicial
notice of the unparalleled demands for relief” under the new circumstances.130
Accordingly, the Parish court upheld an economic regulation, i.e., a state minimum wage
law, on the condition that such a regulation was necessary to achieve a legitimate policy
objective, i.e., prevention of exploitation of workers.

Although Parish overruled Lochner in a formal, technical sense, these two
jurisprudences could still be interpreter in a coherent fashion under the substantive due
process doctrine. Tellingly, the substantive due process doctrine is not without restraints.
Even under the doctrine the government can still restrict economic liberty, if it presents a
compelling reason to regulate. Therefore, while Lochner offers the first part of substantive
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due process doctrine, which represents an ideal of free market and free competition,
Parrish highlights the second part of the doctrine, which denotes legitimate state
intervention. In this sense, Lochner’s legacy still echoes today.131 Lochner can be
reincarnated as a judicial statement reaffirming the principle of market neutrality free
from unwarranted government favoritism, which corresponds to the Madisonian antifactionism.

Therefore, the government should not infringe freedom from restraints on trade
by protecting specific industries, unless it can demonstrate that such protection is
legitimate and that its benefits to society overweighs any adverse impacts to the
“constitutionally protected interests,” such as those of consumers.132 This scrutiny
inevitably invites a Madisonian test under which any possible benefits from favoritism
(protection) are weighed and balanced against the broader public interest deriving from
free competition (economic freedom). Trade protection would fail the test, except for
certain extraordinary measures, such as safeguards under Section 201.133

In sum, the court’s reinvigoration of the structural and substantive due process
principle will effectively discipline the rent-seeking protectionism by rendering the
political economy of international trade more transparent and thus revealing to the public
a true national balance sheet of protectionism.
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C. Internalizing Free Trade Principle

The Framers found a powerful ideology of nation-building via a common market
in the 18th century international law scholar Emmerich de Vattel’s vision of the Law of
Nations and free trade cosmopolitanism. Vattel viewed that:
Nature rarely produces in one district all the various things men have need of;
(…) If all these districts trade with one another, as nature intended, none of them
will be without what is necessary and useful to them, and the intention of nature,
the common mother of mankind, will be fulfilled. (…) Such is the foundation of
the general obligation upon Nations to promote mutual commerce with one
another.134
Premised on the notion that what should be among sovereign nations should also
be among states,135 the Federalist Papers highlighted that the benefits of free, expanded
interstate commerce not only address “reciprocal wants at home” but also contribute to
“exportation to foreign markets,”136 thereby furthering the federal prosperity. After all, the
negative legacy that the Articles of Confederation had left, i.e., economic balkanization
precipitated by tariff war among the Confederates was an eloquent testimony of this
vision of free trade among states.137 Thus, the Constitution conferred upon the Congress a
power to regulate international trade under the Commerce Clause.138
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This holistic understanding of internal (interstate) and external (foreign) trade
under the U.S. Constitution, which can be translated into a constitutional commitment
to openness, speaks for an internalization of international trade in the constitutional
context. The government should self-discipline protectionist trade politics by heeding its
long-term interest as to the rule of law in the sphere of international trade, which is of its
own interest, not just of a utopian or cosmopolitan obligation totally detached from the
genuine national interest.139 One may recall that it was not “selfless altruism,” but
“farsighted, enlightened self-interest,” for the U.S. to reconstruct the international
economic order through GATT after the World War.140 Although such a long-term
interest, or value, is subject to a higher discount rate than a shorter-term and more
immediate national interest, it is still the U.S. interest. In internalizing the long-term
interest against narrow-minded special interests, the Judiciary is in a better position than
other branches that are vulnerable to various means of capture.

In internalizing free trade principle, the Court can take full advantage of the
doctrine of the “Dormant Commerce Clause.” It is a sort of judicial innovation under
which states are prohibited to enact a discriminatory statute to the detriment of foreign
trade as well as interstate commerce.141 For example, in Goya De Puerto Rico Inc. v. Neftali
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Santiago (1999), a U.S. court struck down a Puerto Rican regulation requiring exclusively
foreign importers of pigeon peas to undergo an inspection and paying for the inspection
fee.142 The court ruled that such regulation violated the Commerce Clause since the
regulation “facially discriminate against interstate commerce” as it “imposes significant
costs on pigeon pea importers which are not borne by their local counterparts.”143 The
court also observed that Puerto Rico failed to demonstrate that the challenged regulation
“serves a legitimate local interest,” spotlighting that the Puerto Rico Department of
Agriculture “could have adopted the same safety measures that it implements as to the
locally grown pigeon peas.”144 In this regard, the Dormant Commerce Clause can be a
powerful legal instrument in striking down protectionist local measures.

As another possible means to internalize international norms, the Supreme Court
developed, through yet another judicial ingenuity, a federal stronghold in the areas of
foreign affair. Justice Wendell Holmes’ celebrated holding in Holland is still reverberating,
with an ever stronger force, against the background of the current global trading
community “where the States individually are incompetent to act.”145 Just as migratory
birds in Holland, commerce itself is “transitory,” knowing no state borders, whose nature
defies any parochialistic restrictions. Commerce, while circulating through state and
national borders, realizes a broader terrain of collective welfare, which is both national
and inter-national, than a narrowly defined state interest. In sum, open trade is a federal
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matter since its obligation stems from international agreements. Therefore, trade value
should prevail over parochial trade politics.

Finally, the Court can refer to international law, such as the WTO norms, as a
normative anchor in disciplining protectionism, thereby connecting the domestic and
international sphere under the fidelity to openness. The celebrated Charming Betsy
doctrine stipulates that judges should interpret domestic statutes in a way which can
avoid any possible conflicts with law of nations (international law).146 In the same vein,
eminent constitutional law scholars, including the U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, have argued that domestic court decisions should be more coherent with
foreign, international law (court decisions) regarding similar subject-matter.147
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This judicial version of paying a “decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind”148
may be conceptualized as “indirect recognition” of international norms by the domestic
court.149 Under indirect recognition, while judges are not obliged to directly apply WTO
norms to domestic cases, they may still harmonize their decisions with global trade norms
by invoking certain domestic norms which mirror those global norms. For example, the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution can be employed to proffer global trade
rules, such as non-discrimination, in local courts to regulate trade politics. Protectionism
is to favor narrow special interests at the expenses of the politically diffused, and thus
weak, majority. Protectionism, while violating the National Treatment Clause under the
WTO, may also be inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause in that it discriminates
between enterprises in like circumstances. Such indirect recognition ensures that
domestic and international law communicate with, and finally constitutes, each other in a
converging fashion. This judicial communication achieves a constitutional goal of taming
trade politics.

V. Conclusion

Protectionism is an icon of trade politics, and it has been part of our political life
ever since the creation of the nation. It is not only a reflection of the U.S. governance
structure, such as decentralization, and the culture of lobbying, but also a reaction to
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changing environments, such as the end of the Cold War and bad economy. Together
with social psychology, such as cognitive asymmetry in perceiving gains and pains of trade
as well as fear, the foregoing structural and contextual factors explain why protectionist
politics prevails. Although protectionism may be explicable, it cannot be justifiable.
Protectionism tends to incur unacceptable burdens, both internal (protectionist tax and
cartelization) and external (American Exceptionalism), to the nation on the whole in
exchange for narrow special interests.

If protectionism is a political pathology, it should be addressed by apolitical means,
i.e., law. Yet, special interests’ capture of rule-makers necessitates a broader, i.e.,
constitutional, approach in tackling trade politics. In this regard, the Judiciary can check
and monitor the Congress to discipline protectionist politics through various
constitutional instruments, such as due process and internalization of open trade
principles. As a nation built upon universal values, such as freedom and nondiscrimination, the U.S. should civilize its trade politics through constitutional disciplines
on economic discrimination, i.e., protectionism of us v. them.150
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